This paper examines why the majority of private placements of equity sell at substantial discounts, while a few sell at premiums. We compare private equity offering (PEO) firms with comparable seasoned equity offering (SEO) firms and find that PEO firms had poorer financial performance than SEO firms both prior and subsequent to the year of issue. Furthermore, PEO firms typically showed signs of financial distress prior to the equity issue. Our results also indicate that the holding period returns on investments in PEO firms were substantially below returns on the market index and worse than those of SEO firms. The financial characteristics and the holding period returns of PEO firms issuing at a price premium were found to be significantly better than those that sold at a discount. The private equity premiums may reflect risky future growth opportunities as well as potential takeover premiums.
Introduction
A number of recent studies have observed that equity shares issued privately by publicly traded firms are typically sold to investors at substantial discounts from the market price of the issuing firm's publicly traded shares, although a few are issued at premiums. This raises the question of why private placements of equity are typically issued at sizable discounts. A related question is what distinguishes those relatively few firms that issue shares privately at premiums. This paper explores whether answers to these questions can be found in the characteristics of the firms that issue equity privately. We find that public firms issuing equity privately, in contrast to firms issuing seasoned public equity, commonly experienced financial distress prior to and around the time of the issue.
Several explanations have been advanced in the finance literature to account for the sizable discounts on private placements of equity. These include the ownership concentration (monitoring) hypothesis, the information effect hypothesis, and the liquidity discount hypothesis. The ownership concentration hypothesis, as advanced by Wruck (1989) , holds that the issuing firm benefits from the active role that institutional investors take in the management of the firms whose private equity they purchase, and that private placement discounts compensate these "blockholders" for the monitoring activities they undertake on behalf of all shareholders and for the promise of more effective firm governance. 1 Hertzel and Smith (1993) , extending Myers and Majluf (1984) , contend that the discounts on private placement issues can be explained as compensation to private investors for the costs they incur to reduce information asymmetries about firm value. They further maintain that firms experiencing financial distress at the time of issue have an especially high degree of uncertainty regarding their future success. Hence, the shares of such firms can expect to be sold to private investors at substantial discounts to compensate them for the considerable information costs incurred to assure the potential value of these firms.
According to the liquidity discount explanation, the price discounts on private equity issues compensate private investors for foregoing liquidity. This explanation is most obviously applicable to those shares whose marketability has been limited by SEC Rule 144 resale restrictions. It is well known that liquidity is valuable, but liquidity may be especially important for investors with large stakes in firms experiencing financial difficulties and in firms whose values depend largely on expectations of future investment opportunities. Maug (1998) suggests that liquid markets give private investors the ability to sell their shares before "bad news" arrives in the market and brings a fall in share price. Thus, liquidity provides a valuable option to "bail out." Although it is widely acknowledged that the anticipated loss of liquidity contributes to the price discount, the contribution of liquidity to the price discount has proven to be difficult to measure.
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Similar to Lee and Kocher (2001) , we believe that a complementary explanation for the sizable discount at which private equity is issued relative to the current market price of the stock of the issuing firm is to be found in the characteristics of the firms that issue private equity. To examine if this could be the case, we use publicly available issuance and financial statement information to compare the characteristics and financial condition of a sample of publicly traded PEO firms with those of a matched sample of SEO firms.
Again, like Lee and Kocher (2001) , we contend that the major motivation for public firms to issue equity privately is that they need an infusion of capital but are unable to raise sufficient capital through the traditional public markets at prices and on terms they find 2 Silber (1991) addresses the role of liquidity in the pricing of private equity issues but does not explicitly separate liquidity effects from other effects. Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) concur that reduced liquidity is one factor explaining the sizable discount on newly issued shares of private equity, but they do not really measure its contribution to the discount. acceptable because they are in a weak financial condition. 3 The managers of these firms believe their stock would be subject to severe underpricing in the public capital markets in response to their current financial condition. Thus, we propose that the sizable discount typically found on private equity issues is compensation to the private investors for their willingness to provide needed capital to such firms. 4 Conceptually, the effect of informational asymmetry about the future prospects of publicly traded firms should be the same for both a private issue of equity and a seasoned public offering. However, the preexisting financial condition of the issuing firm may change the risk resulting from information asymmetry between firm managers and investors. Hence, as suggested by Hertzel and Smith (1993) , the expected cost of resolving information asymmetry will be higher or lower depending on the financial well being of the issuing firms. Firms in financial distress are expected to have higher costs of resolving information asymmetry than financially healthy ones. Prudent investing in the equity of such firms requires extensive due diligence into their financial condition and future prospects as a condition of making the investment, all the more so since individual private investors typically invest in large blocks of privately-issued equity. Thus, we conclude that the willingness of sophisticated private investors to provide capital on terms agreeable to both sides (supplier and recipient) comes after a due diligence investigation reconciles management and investor views of the long-term future prospects of the firm. In addition, their willingness to invest in such firms may also be a function of the confidence (some might say hubris) that these sophisticated investors have in their ability to provide quality management oversight of the firm in which they invest over an investment horizon. The fact that sophisticated private investors are willing to invest large amounts of capital in these companies sends a quality signal to other potential investors, and this certification has been credited by researchers for the generally observed positive stock price response following the news of an issuance of private equity.
A market for privately issued equity exists because these issues offer well-diversified institutional investors the prospect of expected risk-adjusted returns higher than those obtainable from publicly-traded securities, thereby improving the efficient opportunity set of their investment portfolios. It has been suggested that private equity investments share market inefficiencies with asset groups such as venture capital investments, distressed debt, and real estate that allow investors to obtain higher expected risk-adjusted returns as a result of adroit fundamental analysis of an investment's prospects coupled with the skillful application of active management (Fenn et al., 1995 and Anson, 2001) .
Not all private equity transactions are issued at discounts; a relatively small number are issued at premiums. This study also examines whether the characteristics of firms that issue private equity at a discount differ from those that issue at a premium. In an attempt to distinguish the relatively few firms that issued shares of private equity at premiums from the large majority that issued at discounts, we compare issuance and financial statement information about those two sets of firms to see if differences in firm characteristics may be a factor explaining this phenomenon.
Finally, we compare holding period returns on investments in PEO firms and in SEO firms to see if these returns reflect differences in firm characteristics. Our findings indicate that firms issuing shares privately underperform firms that issue seasoned equity offerings. The results of studies by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Afleck-Graves (1995) that find a "new issues puzzle" have been challenged in a recent study by Eckbo et al. (2000) . The latter concludes that the alleged new issues puzzle is really the outcome of poor risk control as a result of using matched firms that are not comparable in terms of risk in the post issue period. In this study we do not investigate whether issuing equity changes the risk characteristics of issuing firms relative to non-issuing firms as argued by Eckbo et al. (2000) . Intuitively, the private issue of equity should not affect the market risk of issuing firms in the post issue period any differently than does issuing equity publicly, and thus our matched
The explanation for this observed underperformance could be that the firms fail to recover as anticipated. The market, in short, may have been too optimistic about the future financial recovery of the PEO firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a description of our samples of PEO and SEO firms. Section 3 describes the results of our empirical analysis. Section 4 contains the conclusion.
Sample Description
The private equity data for this study was obtained from FMV Opinions Inc., a private firm that performs valuation and advisory services for private and public companies doing private placement transactions. The portion of FMV's database used for this study included private equity issues from 1985 to the end of 1995. The transactions in the study were obtained through searches using a number of sources, including Security Data Corporation, Edgar, Dow Jones News Retrieval, and S&P Corporate Transactions Records. FMV went through a "cleaning" process that resulted in 189 plain vanilla private placements of restricted common stock for the sample period. 6 The sample includes exchange-listed firms and firms with sample of SEO firms should be comparable in terms of the types of risk characteristics examined by Eckbo et al. (2000) . 6 FMV began compiling its restricted stock study at the firm's inception in 1991. Its staff reviewed thousands of transactions during the construction of the database. Transactions were eliminated from the study for the following reasons:
1.
The transaction was not a private placement or was announced and later withdrawn.
2.
The firm's stock was not traded on a domestic exchange. 3.
Significant pieces of information were unavailable, to the extent that we were unable to determine the private placement discount. This includes issues for which we were unable to determine the reference market price for the fully liquid shares, the private placement transaction price was unavailable, or only net transaction proceeds to the issuer was reported publicly (net of unknown transaction costs and fees). 4.
The transaction was not a "plain vanilla" common stock issue. The stock was either preferred stock, convertible preferred stock, or some kind of hybrid equity-shares trading on the over-the-counter (OTC) market. Additionally, 45 firms were removed from the sample because the exact offer date was not specified, leaving a sample size of 144 private equity issues. Table 1 describes the characteristics of PEO firms in the final sample. Summary statistics are provided for the full sample, for issues sold with no registration rights, and for issues sold with registration rights. As shown in Table 1 , the private placement price discounts average approximately 19 percent. The fraction issued is the ratio of the number of private shares issued to the total number of shares outstanding following the issue, which includes the number of newly issued private shares. The average fraction issued is approximately 14 percent. These two summary statistics are consistent with Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) .
To form the matching sample of SEO firms, a list of firms offering seasoned equity over the sample period was obtained from the Investment Dealer's Digest Directory of Corporate Financing along with the offer price, the announcement date of the issues, and the issue volume. Market capitalization and financial statement variables were obtained from COMPUSTAT. Stock prices for the PEO firms and the SEO firms were obtained from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) daily tape. derivative security; it was issued as part of a stock-warrant unit or had units attached; or detachable units, warrants, or options were issued with the common stock.
5.
There were special contractual arrangements between buyer and seller limiting either the economic upside or downside of the buyer. 6.
The stock was issued in connection with a merger or acquisition, in exchange for service, or in connection with any other transaction that could cast doubt on what the fair market value of the restricted stock was. 7.
The stock was registered and became fully marketable either prior to the transaction or within a few days thereof. A total of 123 issues are without resignation rights; 21 issues have restriction rights that permit public resale. For some variables, sample size may not sum to 144 due to missing data. Private equity share price discount is calculated as the offer price of the private shares over the market price of the firm's publicly traded equity at the offer date of the private placement. Market value is the product of number of shares outstanding before private placement and the market price of the firm's publicly traded equity shares at the offer date. Market value, total assets, interest bearing debt, sales revenue, and net income are all in millions of dollars. Percentage Discount is 100
, where O P is the offer price of the private equity shares and M P is the closing price of common stock on the placement date.
PEO and SEO firms are matched on the basis of 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification Codes (SICs) and market capitalization.
7 Each firm with a PEO is matched with one or more firms in the same industry of similar market capitalization that issued a SEO within the sample period (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) . A firm is considered to be a comparably sized firm if its market capitalization is within plus or minus 20 percent of the market capitalization of the firm issuing equity privately. Seventeen of the private equity issues were eliminated from the sample because their market value was too small to find SEO matches. Table 2 summarizes the industry distribution (by 2-digit SIC) of the firms in both the SEO sample and the PEO sample. The sample of SEOs consists of 2,998 offerings with average market capitalization of $783.65 million. An examination of Table 2 reveals that the firms that populate this market are not a cross-section of firms in the economy. Rather they tend to be smaller firms in more risky lines of business.
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Note that over 20 percent of the PEO firms in our sample are in the 2800 SIC category, whereas the largest industry concentration in the SEO sample is 8.9 percent. This suggests that private placement is not equally likely across all industry categories. 7 The limited size of our SEO sample restricts the number of variables on which we can match firms. In particular, to add a third matching variable, such as the issuing year, would significantly reduce the size of the control sample. Not matching by year, however, creates a potential problem in that the influence of market conditions is not modeled. This problem is reduced in our control group because each PEO firm is generally matched with several SEO firms across different years during the sample period, with up and down years tending to offset one another.
8 Although Lee and Kocher (2001) demonstrate that certain characteristics of private placement firms are different from firms issuing equity publicly, their samples of private and public equity-issuing firms have similar industry representations, which is contrary to the industry representations of the two sets of firms in our samples. Table 3 compares the firms in the PEO sample with their matched firms in the SEO sample on a variety of firm and issue characteristics. The PEO sample is subdivided into quartiles of the distribution of price discounts, and the average discount for each quartile is displayed. The SEO sample is subdivided into four groups corresponding to the quartiles of their matched PEOs. For each sample, the table shows the average discounts for each of the quartiles. Also shown are the average values of selected characteristics of the firms in each quartile along with the average offer price. It is noteworthy that the average earnings per share (EPS) of the matched SEO firms are positive in each quartile whereas the average EPS of the PEO firms are negative in each quartile. The quartile averages of the market-to-book ratios of the PEO firms are all higher than the quartile averages for the SEO firms. The average market-tobook ratio is particularly high for PEO firms with discounts in the fourth quartile (the highest discount firms). The size of the discount increases monotonically as both market capitalization and total assets decrease. This conforms to numerous findings in financial research that risk is associated with firm size, with small firms the most risky. The percentage of intangible assets and the debt ratios of the PEO and SEO firms in each quartile are similar. Finally, the offer prices of the PEO issues are in general lower than those of the SEO issues.
Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis is divided into three sections. First, we investigate whether a relationship exists between the discount on private equity offerings and firm characteristics as measured by selected financial ratios. To accomplish this, we conduct a comparative analysis, using financial ratios, of the operating performance of firms issuing equity privately and of a matched set of firms issuing seasoned equity. Second, we compare holding period returns of the sample PEO firms with those of the matching sample of SEO firms. Finally, we compare the characteristics of firms that issue private equity at premiums with the characteristics of firms issuing at discounts.
Comparative Analysis of Firm Characteristics
The financial performance of the firms issuing private equity, measured by selected financial ratios, is compared with that of a matched sample of seasoned equity offering firms (SEOs) to see if significant differences exist between the two sets of firms. Table 4 displays values for four operating performance ratios plus the marketto-book and debt ratios for both the sample of PEO firms and the SEO firms in the matched sample. The four operating performance ratios are operating income to total assets, net profit margin (net income to sales), gross profit margin (operating income to sales), and return on assets (net income to total assets). Operating income is operating income before depreciation, interest, and taxes (OIBD). Data to calculate these ratios were obtained from COMPUSTAT. Ratios are computed for four years prior to the offer year, the offer year, and four years subsequent to the offer year, for a total of nine years.
We follow the convention of reporting median values because of skewness in the accounting ratios. The data in Table 4 are stratified into panels by the six ratios described above. In each ratio-defined panel, six rows of data are displayed. The first four rows show the median ratio values and the sample sizes for the PEO firms and their matching SEO firms, respectively. The fifth row shows the difference in median ratio values, and the sixth row reports the Z-statistics on scores of the Wilcoxon rank sum test (discussed in more detail below).
Examination of the ratios provides interesting insights into the condition of the PEO firms. The median values of the four operating performance ratios indicate that the operating performance of the PEO firms is worse than that of the SEO firms in the matched sample. For all of the operating performance ratios except the gross profit margin, the median values for the PEO firms are negative in the offer year and for at least two years prior to the offer year. These ratio values imply that the PEO firms were experiencing a period of financial distress prior to the offer date, with the implication that other sources of financing may have been effectively closed to many of the firms issuing PEOs. This contrasts with the operating performance of the SEO firms in our sample, which improved prior to and peaked in the year of offer. The market-to-book ratios for the PEO firms are higher than for the SEO firms, which suggests that the formers' valuation is based more heavily on expected growth opportunities than the SEO firms and that their expected value is therefore more speculative. 9 The latter, in turn, would justify a higher risk premium and thus a larger price discount. The debt ratios of the two samples do not differ very much, indicating that leverage is not an important distinguishing factor. The Wilcoxon rank sum test is used to test the null hypothesis that the distribution of the financial ratios of the PEO firms and SEO firms are the same under the assumption that the two sample distributions are independent. The test results are that the operating performance ratios of the two samples are statistically different, indicating that the performance of the PEOs is worse than that of the matching SEOs. The Z-statistics for the OIBD to total assets, the return on assets (ROA), and the net profit margin are significant at less than 5 percent for the three years prior to the year of offer and for at least two years following the offer year. The Z-statistic for the gross profit margin is significant at less than 5 percent for the two years prior to the year of offer.
As shown in Table 4 , the operating performance of firms issuing private equity subsequent to the issue date was worse than that of the matching SEO firms. However, the operating performance of PEO firms generally improved in the years following the issue relative to their earlier performance. This indicates that to some degree a turnaround occurs, demonstrating ex post that the expectations of investors in the private equity firms were not unfounded.
The above comparisons of operating performance suggest that the large average price discount on PEO issues at least partially represents compensation to investors willing to make risky equity investments in companies in a weak financial condition and also to hold those investments for relatively long periods of time because of the loss of liquidity due to the Rule 144 resale restriction.
Holding Period Returns on Private Equity Investments
We next compare the holding period returns of PEO and SEO firms to see if there is a correspondence between the operating performance data and the market performance of PEO and SEO firms. Table 5 reports the annual geometric returns and the holding period returns (HPRs) for the PEO firms, the matched SEO firms, the return including dividends on the CRSP value-weighted market index, and PEO market-adjusted returns for four years subsequent to the offer date. The annual geometric return is calculated for each of four years using daily returns obtained from CRSP and the standard model:
where R iT is the annual geometric return for firm i in year T, r it is the daily return for firm i on day t, a is the private equity offer date, and b is the number of trading days over which the annual return is calculated.
Holding period returns for two, three, and four years are also calculated. The m-year holding period return (HPR) is calculated as:
where m is the number of years (2, 3, and 4) over which holding period returns are calculated.
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The returns on the market index are calculated by compounding the daily CRSP value-weighted index over the same number of trading days for each PEO issue. The annual market-adjusted return is the difference between the annual geometric return for PEO firms and the return for the same time period on the market index.
As reported in Table 5 , the annual geometric returns for the PEO firms are generally lower, except for year 2, than the average annual returns for the SEO firms in the matched sample. The annual marketadjusted returns are negative in all years except for year 2. The market-adjusted holding period return of PEOs is negative for all holding periods, and increasingly so as the holding period increases to four years. The minimum holding period for PEO investments is assumed to be two years since resale during the period of study was generally restricted for two years. As above, the returns are calculated without the private equity discount. The empirical results imply that shares of the PEO firms would be profitable investments (i.e., earn an excess return relative to the market index) once the deep price discount is factored in (the average price discount is approximately 19%) if the shares are held for two years. This result assumes, however, that the market risk of the PEO shares is the same as that of the market index. If they are more risky, and their average beta suggests that they are more risky, then on a risk-adjusted basis, even with the discount, they underperform the market index. 11 10 Any year for which only partial information is available is dropped from the calculation of annual returns in cases of firms issuing private equity for which CRSP does not contain sufficient information to calculate annual returns for four complete years.
11 The average equity beta of the PEO firms is 1.29. The equity beta is calculated using five years of monthly stock returns prior to the month of the PEO. If more than three years of trading days are missing, the firm is eliminated from the sample. The CRSP value-weighted index is used as the approximation for the market index.
Price Discount vs. Price Premium Firms
Suppose that firms issuing equity privately can be divided into two broad classes. In the first class are firms experiencing serious financial distress. Given their poor financial condition, private placement may be the only feasible way for these firms to raise needed capital, contingent on the ability of their management to convince sophisticated investors that the firms have positive net present value (NPV) investment opportunities that will substantially improve their financial situation in the future. The second class consists of firms that are not experiencing serious financial difficulties but which nonetheless exhibit signs of financial weakness. The managers of such firms, believing the firm has positive NPV projects but fearing undervaluation of their shares by the public equity market, choose the private placement route as the least costly method of raising capital.
It may be that firms issuing private equity at a large discount fall into the first class and that firms issuing at a premium fall into the second class. This possibility is examined by comparing the financial characteristics of firms that issue shares privately at a discount with those of firms that issue at a premium. In addition, we look at the operating performance of firms issuing at a premium for up to four years following the placement date to see if the confidence of management and investors about the quality of these firms' investment projects was indeed certified by subsequent experience.
Panel A of Table 6 displays summary statistics of firms issuing equity through private placement at price discounts and at price premiums in the year of offering. On average, the premium firms are larger, as indicated by both market capitalization and total assets, and they have larger revenues (sales) and net income than the discount firms. The percentage of intangible assets is also higher for price discount firms, possibly indicating that their expected value is more speculative. Panel B of Table 6 compares the financial performance of price premium firms and price discount firms as measured by the market-to-book ratio, the debt to assets ratio, earnings per share (EPS), and the following four operating performance ratios: net and gross profit margins, return on assets, and operating cash flow to total assets. Ratio values are shown for four years prior to the year of offering, for the offering year, and for four years following the year of offering. Unfortunately, the sample size of premium firms is very small (n = 14), which limits the inferences that can be made, but the results are sufficiently interesting to warrant discussion. The median market-to-book and debt to asset ratios of the premium firms are consistently lower than those of the discount firms. The four operating performance ratios for the premium firms are all higher than the corresponding ratios of the discount firms. Similarly, earnings per share of the premium firms consistently exceed those of the price discount firms. Price discount firms on average have four consecutive years of negative earnings per share including the issuing year, whereas the premium firms on average have positive earnings in the years prior to and through the year of issue, although their earnings decrease from year -3 to the year of issue. If investor expectations are formed by prior experience, then expectations for the operating performance of the premium firms should exceed the performance expectations for the discount firms, thereby supporting a pricing difference for the shares of these two groups at the time of the offering.
To obtain additional insight into why some private equity shares are issued at price premiums, we further examine the characteristics of the premium firms. Table 7 shows the price premium (negative discount), the percentage growth in revenue, the percentage growth in earnings, and the HPR for the individual premium firms. The premium firms are classified into two groups on the basis of the age of a firm as a publicly traded company (dating from the firm's IPO).
Firms that have been publicly traded six years or less prior to 1997 are categorized as "young firms." Three of the firms fall into this category. The remaining firms, called "established firms," have been publicly traded longer than 15 years. Information about these firms is shown for four different time periods: the year prior to the issue, and then one year, three years, and five years following the issue.
In the established firm category, two firms with sizable price premiums have merged subsequent to the private placement date. The large price premium for the shares of these firms could well reflect a takeover premium paid by the private investors. The remaining five firms (6 issues) in this category have an average HPR of negative 18% for the year before the equity issue, a positive HPR of 28.83% three years after the issue, and a positive HPR of 126.61% five years after the issue. On average, the firms in the established category experienced large revenue and earnings growth in the three and five Note: "Young firms" were in existence six years or less prior to 1997; "Established firms" were in existence for at least 15 years. Firms 148 and 149 are two private equity issues made by the same firm; both issues are priced at a premium, and -4.96% is their average premium. Financial statement information is only partial for 1998; growth rates and HPRs are calculated over 1995 to 1997.
year period following the year of issue. This supports the supposition that the private placement market may be the most cost efficient way of raising capital for firms with good investment projects that experience temporary financial weakness around the time of the issue, which influences the public equity market to undervalue their shares. The three "young" firms offer an interesting contrast to the established firms. In spite of impressive growth in revenue, 12 these firms, on average, show negative earnings and negative HPRs in the years following the equity issue. For these young firms insufficient information is available to make a judgment about investment performance. However, these results are consistent with those of other researchers who show negative returns on investments in IPOs beyond the period immediately following the issue.
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Conclusion
This study demonstrates that the financial performance, indicative of the financial condition, of firms that issue equity privately is different from firms that issue shares publicly. In general, the firms in our sample that issued private equity suffered from poor financial performance both prior and subsequent to the year of issue. They underperformed the matched SEO firms on all four of the financial 12 The impressive growth in revenue could be misleading, however, because these firms are basically start-up enterprises with little initial revenue.
13 See Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) . ratios examined. In contrast to the SEO firms, firms that issued shares privately showed signs of financial distress prior to the issue. Consequently, the deep price discount typically found on private issues of equity may be explained, in part, by the increased risk posed by the relatively adverse financial condition of these firms, which may have been magnified by the loss of liquidity resulting from the Rule 144 resale restriction in place during the study period.
We also distinguished between firms that sold issues to investors at a price premium from firms that sold at a price discount. Premium firms were found to outperform discount firms in all years examined. It is plausible that the premium reflects expectations of an increase in firm value resulting from promising investment opportunities. The private equity market may in fact be the most cost efficient way of raising capital for firms experiencing temporary financial weakness but whose management is confident of being able to persuade sophisticated investors that the firms have investment opportunities that will substantially increase the value of these firms in the future. Our analysis does not rule out the possibility that the premium can incorporate information about a possible takeover or is payment for some valuable element of control. It does, however, provide evidence that expectations of value-adding investments can be another explanation.
Finally, our empirical investigation of holding period returns on private equity investments suggests that in the absence of measures, such as some form of credit enhancement, that reduce the risk to investors purchasing large blocks of shares of private equity, the average price discount on privately placed shares, although substantial, may nonetheless be too small to compensate investors on a riskadjusted basis.
